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IPOs and the Slow Death of Section 5 
 
Donald C. Langevoort∗ and Robert B. Thompson+ 
 
 
 Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 is slowly dying.  We have to 
be careful about making such a bold-sounding claim because Section 5 
performs two distinct legal functions.  First, it creates a presumption that 
offerings of securities using the facilities of interstate commerce have to be 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  
Elsewhere, we and others have described the momentous shifts in the 
pattern of exemptions that allow issuers to avoid registration, especially 
after the JOBS Act of 2012.1  This function is very much alive, albeit in 
ways that to us seem to push in the direction of more unregistered capital 
raising transactions rather than more public offerings.   
 That is not the aspect of Section 5 that concerns us here, however.  
A separate function takes up almost all of Section 5’s statutory text: 
restraining the marketing of registered public offerings so that salesmanship 
does not run ahead of the mandatory disclosure that is supposed to inform 
investor decisions of whether to buy or not, something often referred to as 
“gun-jumping.”2  This is a devolution we find interesting and insufficiently 
                                                          
∗ Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
+ Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private 
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2013).  
See also Michael Guttentag, Protection from What?:  Investor Protection and the JOBS 
Act, 13 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 207 (2013); William K. Sjostrom, Rebalancing Private 
Placement Regulation, 36 U. Seattle L. Rev. 1143 (2013). 
2 See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 154-55 (7th 
ed. 2013). “Beating the gun” was the phrase more often used to describe similar behavior 
before 1933 and in the first decades after the passage of federal securities laws. See LOUIS 
LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed. 1961) at 194 et seq.  Paul Mahoney describes pre-
1933 practice by selling agents to avoid similar bans by the underwriting syndicates of the 
day. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. L. 
Studies. 1 (2001). 
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examined in legal scholarship.  Our focus will be entirely on the initial 
public offering (“IPO”), the paradigmatic form of issuer capital-raising, and 
not offerings by seasoned issuers.3 
 We describe this as a slow death because it began almost as soon as 
the Act was passed.  As we shall see in Part I, Section 5 started as a simple, 
rigid and coherent rule that limited sales efforts to after the SEC had 
declared the registration statement “effective.”  The industry found this 
impracticable and to some extent just ignored it, setting in motion  two 
decades of negotiations as to a proper balance between the demand for pre-
effective marketing and the concerns about gun-jumping.  A legislative 
compromise, eventually reached in 1954, gave us the statutory language 
that is mostly still with us today.  The 1954 amendments created the three 
distinct time periods in a registered public offering that beginning securities 
law students still struggle to master: the pre-filing period during which 
offers and sales were forbidden;4 the waiting period during which oral (but 
not written) offers were allowed;5 and the post-effective period, where sales 
occur and final prospectuses are delivered.6   
 For many decades, however, this compromise had considerable bite.  
It generated what we call the quiet period, during which issuers and 
underwriters had to limit severely what they said outside of the statutory 
prospectus (and how and when they might say it) if the communication 
might in any way “whet the appetite” of investors and thus be an illegal 
offer.7  Gradually, quiet period practices emerged that put pressure on 
Section 5’s awkward distinctions, especially as between oral and written 
communications.  In response to these and other concerns in a time of rapid 
                                                          
3   Seasoned equity offerings pose a different set of questions because the issuer raising 
capital is already publicly traded, and thus familiar to the marketplace.  See COX ET AL. 
supra note 2id. at 178-89.  The evolution of the public offering for larger seasoned issuers 
is mainly about “shelf registration.”  Id. at 189-97.  The demise of Section 5 in this context 
is even greater, but implicates an entirely different set of issues.  Increasingly, seasoned 
issuer offerings are quite different in execution from IPOs.   See Todd Hamblet & Nora 
Gibson, Confidentially Marketed Public Offerings: Let’s Get Technical, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1303 (July 15, 2013). 
4  COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 155-64. 
5  Id. at 164-74. 
6  Id. at 174-78. 
7  See Eric Chiapenelli, Gun-Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous Offerings of Securities, 
50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 457 (1989). 
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technological evolution,8 the SEC acted in 2005 to thoroughly restructure 
the public offering environment through an extensive set of rule-based 
exemptions and safe harbors (the “2005 Reforms”).9  Section 5 lost much of 
its heft as a result.10  In subtle and striking ways that have thus far received 
mostly superficial analysis, the JOBS Act recently took away even more 
with respect to most IPOs.11 
 Our aim here is to document all this, and assess the current state of 
Section 5’s fragile health.  To document and assess is not necessarily to 
criticize. The compromise reflected in Section 5 was conceptually 
incoherent from the beginning, and tied to an understanding of the public 
offering process that quickly became outdated.  Perhaps the quiet period 
was not that good an idea in the first place, or the markets have changed 
enough to demand a new regulatory regime.12  In Part II, we turn to a brief 
survey of the contemporary literature in financial economics on IPOs.  
Legal scholars have paid attention to certain aspects of the economics of 
public offerings, particularly the persistent underpricing that occurs and the 
abuses that ensue in allocating scarce shares.13  But by and large, the 
prevailing view of Section 5 among lawyers still seems rooted in an overly 
                                                          
8  Lurking in the background of these reforms are the First Amendment implications of 
Section 5, which operates as a form of prior restraint and might seem vulnerable to attack.  
See Joseph Grundfest, Regulation FD in the Age of Facebook and Twitter: Should the SEC 
Sue Netflix?, (Jan. 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209525.   
9  Securities Offering Reform, Rel. No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44722 (Aug. 3, 2005) 
(hereinafter “2005 Release”). 
10  For a highly critical exploration, see Joseph Morrissey, Rhetoric and Reality: Investor 
Protection and the Securities Regulation Reform of 2005, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 561 (2007). 
11  The JOBS changes on which we focus are in the form of revised procedures easing the 
regulatory obligations for public offerings by “emerging growth companies.”  The JOBS 
Act does much more than this, and these other reforms have received more careful 
attention.  For our analyses, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, 
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo. L.J. 
337 (2013); Thompson & Langevoort, supra, note 1. 
12  See James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 
Law & Contemp. Probs., 11 (2000). 
13   E.g., Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 
711 (2005); Sean Griffith, A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of 
Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 583 (2004); Therese H. Maynard, 
Spinning in a Hot IPO: Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 2023 (2002).  The perceived abuses coming out of all this because the subject of 
SEC and FINRA rulemaking, see COX ET AL., supra, note 2 at 135-36, as well as extensive 
class action litigation.   
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simplistic and archaic impression of the offering process.  The persistence 
of book-building as the standard mechanism for U.S. (and to a large extent 
global) public offerings, and the value embedded in it of facilitating the 
flow of information from the purchasers to the underwriter and visa versa, 
reveals a complex negotiation between underwriters and institutional buyers 
that helps explain much of what is happening prior to the effective date of 
the registration statement, from which we can learn a great deal.   
 Our principal claim in Part II is that the demise of Section 5’s 
communication rules is best understood as an embrace of book-building, 
facilitating the two-way communication process on which that practice 
depends.  But we also consider what might have been lost in this 
remarkable transformation of the selling rules.  Because book-building 
involves communications with presumably sophisticated institutional 
investors, it becomes easy to doubt that there is much if any need for 
protection at all.  But the finance literature also stresses the complex 
interplay between these institutional negotiations and the stimulation of 
largely retail investor-driven demand in the secondary trading market, 
which was once clearly within Section 5’s constraint but is less so after 
deregulation.   
 To assess whether investors are better off or not as a result, we turn 
to two main justifications that have been given for the deregulation.  The 
first is that any loss in prophylactic protection can be made up for by the 
threat of liability, particularly with an enhanced Section 12(a)(2).  We find 
this unpersuasive for a variety of reasons.  The other—amply visible in the 
long history of Section 5—is a faith in the “filtration” process, that retail 
investors gain protection because of the availability of the preliminary 
prospectus during the waiting period to those involved in the selling process 
if not the investors themselves.  Here again we are not particularly 
convinced, as we explain in Part III.  Putting aside the biased incentives that 
affect filtration, much of what is most important—and conveyed privately 
to the institutions in the course of book-building—is forward-looking 
information that probably need not appear in the formal disclosure, whether 
preliminary or final.  None of this is an argument for returning to the old 
prophylactics of Section 5.  But it is cause for the SEC and FINRA to pay 
closer attention to the retail investor effects of the IPO sales process, 
especially in the post-JOBS Act era.   
5 
 
 Before we begin, some basics are in order for those not especially 
familiar with public offerings.14  An issuer seeking to raise capital in a 
public offering must first prepare and file a detailed disclosure document 
with the SEC, called the registration statement, and then await the staff’s 
approval before actually selling the securities.  When satisfied that 
disclosure is adequate and selling can begin, the staff declares the 
registration statement “effective.”  The document that conveys the required 
information to investors (taken directly from the registration statement) is 
the statutory prospectus, which has both a preliminary and final form.   
 IPOs in the United States are generally done on a fixed-price basis.  
Roughly at the same time of the effective date, the issuer sells the entire 
amount of newly-issued securities at a discount to a syndicate of 
underwriters, who—directly or through other dealers—then quickly turn 
around and resell to investors at the price set forth in the registration 
statement, a process referred to as a firm-commitment underwriting.  The 
investors who purchase directly from the syndicate will ordinarily be a mix 
of institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, etc.) and “retail” 
investors (households and individuals of varying degrees of sophistication), 
but usually more the former than the latter.  Contemporaneous with the 
public offering the issuer will typically list its securities on a securities 
exchange, so that secondary trading of the newly issued securities begins 
immediately.  Investors who were not allocated shares by the underwriters 
in the initial round can thus acquire shares on the open market, albeit at the 
market price prevailing at the time of their purchase rather than at the fixed 
price.  Their sellers will be investors who received initial allocations and 
quickly “flip” those shares, or the underwriters.  For a period of time after 
the start of trading, the underwriters will take steps to assure that the market 
price of the securities stays at or—preferably—above the fixed offering 
price.   
 Book-building is the effort that occurs prior to the effective date, 
mainly during the waiting period, as the underwriters negotiate over 
offering terms with sophisticated institutional investors who are key 
potential investors.  What they learn in these negotiations helps them set the 
offering price, the economics of which we will consider in Part II.  There 
                                                          
14  For further elaboration on this brief overview, see generally COX ET AL., supra, note 2, 
chap. 4; see also CHARLES JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 
AND THE SECURITIES LAWS (4th ed. 2012). 
6 
 
we will see that the offering price will deliberately be set below what the 
market is likely to demand when secondary trading begins after the 
effective date.   
 
I. SECTION 5’S RESTRAINTS ON MARKETING: A DEVOLUTION IN FOUR ACTS 
 
The Securities Act of 1933 radically changed the legal structure 
governing how securities are sold in this country, first requiring that the full 
story about the company and its securities be told through the medium of a 
registration statement (and its statutory prospectus), and second blocking 
alternative channels of communication that might distort or preempt the 
statutorily required story.  The first eighty years in some ways can be seen 
as a long retreat from the stark language of the statute’s prohibition against 
communication, a story that divides into four distinct regulatory eras.    
 While the deregulatory direction is unmistakable, we see themes that 
show a more nuanced approach through all four eras attuned to broader 
themes of how information gets to investors and the price discovery that 
goes on in a pre-selling of IPOs where communication between market 
makers and potential buyers can be seen as aiding investor protection.  That 
doesn’t mean that the balance is not difficult and that the government can 
yield to political and industry pressure as to deregulatory changes, but it 
does require a more detailed analysis.  
 
A. The Ban on Communications (and Selling) Before the Effective 
Date under the Original 1933 Template  
 
President Franklin Roosevelt, in proposing securities legislation to 
the Congress in the first month of his administration, set out a goal “to put 
the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller.”15  The President’s 
message also highlighted concern about high pressure sales tactics that had 
produced “severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the 
                                                          
15 S. Rep. No. 47 at 6-7 & H.R. No. 85 at 1-2, 73rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1933).  
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part of many persons and corporations selling securities.”16  A prominent 
study of securities markets described as sales tactics designed “to induce 
customers to buy, rather than to inform them….[T]he guiding principles, 
and the devices were those that had been successfully employed in the 
fields of advertising and salesmanship.”17  The heart of the ‘33 Act was 
section 5(a) with two broad prohibitions.  First, no security could be sold 
unless a registration statement was in effect with the extensive disclosure 
about a company and its securities required by the Act;18 second, sales 
effort by other means were banned until that filing had been reviewed by a 
federal agency and declared effective. 19   
In the first two decades under the ‘33 Act, industry practices quickly 
pushed beyond the seeming bright-line prohibition on selling before the 
effective date of a registration statement while early agency regulators 
focused on distinguishing those communications that were helpful to 
investors (those that were “prospectus like”) and those that were worrisome 
(those that indicated hard core selling). From the beginning it was clear the 
new law did not ban all communications by the issuer or underwriters.  Face 
to face communications or other exchanges that did not take place via a 
means of intrastate commerce were not covered.  The Federal Trade 
Commission, charged with administering the new act during its first year, 
quickly declared (as suggested by the House Committee report) that issuers 
could distribute circulars “clearly and unmistakably marked [as] 
informative only, negativing without equivocation either impliedly or 
expressly an intent to solicit offers to buy or to make an offer to sell.”20  
This introduced a conceptual dilemma of distinguishing between 
communication and solicitation that Professor Louis Loss said was to 
                                                          
16  Id. 
17 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITIES MARKETS (1935) at 566-67. 
18 15 U.S.C. §77e(a) (prohibiting sale or delivery of security unless registration statement 
in effect). See §§7, 10 and Schedule A for the material required in a registration statement  
19 15 U.S.C. §77e(a) (1933) (prohibiting offer to sell or offer to buy unless registration 
statement in effect). This language was moved into a new section 5(c) in 1954 and made 
applicable only to the period before the filing of a registration statement. See notes infra. 
After the effective date, sales communications could occur by free writing so long as the 
final prospectus had already been sent or given to the person receiving the communication 
or accompanied the communication. See 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(10) exempting free writing from 
the definition of “prospectus” after the effective date, removing these communications 
from Section 5(b)’s otherwise blanket ban on the use of any prospectus that didn’t meet the 
requirements of section 10. See 15 U.S.C. §77e(b). 
20 Sec. Act. Rel. 70 (1933); see H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong. 1st Sess 12-13 (1933). 
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“plague both the Commission and the industry for twenty-one years” (i.e. 
until the 1954 amendments).21 
During this first era, the SEC (to whom the administration of the Act 
was transferred in 1934 after the SEC’s formation) focused its efforts on 
adaptations of the section 10 prospectus that would be permissible prior to 
the effective date of the registration statement.  General Counsel opinions 
issued in 1935 and 1936 supported industry use of what would become the 
“red herring” prospectus and blue card summaries of prospectuses.22 The 
first refers to the red legend added to the communication disaffirming any 
intent to offer to sell, and the second  to 5” x 8” cards sold by Standard & 
Poor’s to underwriters and dealers and their circulation among customers 
summarizing the registration statement material.23   
Clearly the SEC contemplated that the information in the 
registration statement would be circulated during the waiting period.24  
James Landis, one of the principal drafters of the statute and the 
Commission’s second chair, described the introduction of the “completely 
novel” concept of the waiting period in section 5 as providing the 
opportunity “for the financial world to acquaint itself with the basic data 
underlying the security issue and through the acquaintance to circulate 
among the buying public as well as independent dealers some intimation of 
                                                          
21 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed 1961) at 187. 
22  Securities Act Release 464 (1935); Securities Act Release 802 (1936). 
23 See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION (3D ED.) at 396-398.  Other 
related actions during this first period include: (i) the SEC’s April 1945 statement of policy 
that it would not accelerate the effective date of a registration statement if an inaccurate red 
herring prospectus had been circulated and not corrected; (ii) the promulgation of Rule 131 
in December 1946 that a red herring was not generally an offer; (iii) the promulgation of 
Rule 132 in October 1952 providing a brief identifying statement covering no more than 16 
specified topic would not be considered an offer the SEC’s attendant statement of its 
acceleration policy. See Securities Act Release 3453 (1952). 
24  LOSS 2D ED., supra note 21 at 187. (“Although any form of pre-effective solicitation by 
use of the mails or interstate facilities was categorically forbidden, the whole theory of the 
waiting period was that the information contained in the registration statement would be 
disseminated so that the investing public would be able to make an intelligent 
determination whether to buy when the statement became effective”); Address  of SEC 
Chair James J. Caffrey, September 27, 1946 at 3 ( in discussing red herring prospectus, 
noting “we have from the earliest days recognized that getting reliable information out to 
the public during the waiting period was part of the fundamental policy of  the law.”). 
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its quality.”25  The contemplated “acquaintance” necessarily was of an 
indirect or filtration variety.  The actual delivery of the prospectus to 
purchasers was (and remains today) only required by statute with the 
delivery of the stock certificate or the confirmation of sale, which, of 
course, would not occur until after the investor was legally bound to the 
contract.26  
The process by which this transmission of information was to occur 
was not entirely clear.  Loss described it as an apparent expectation that 
underwriters and dealers “would disseminate information without in any 
way puffing his wares,” a seemingly naïve assumption negated by the fact 
that “salespersons are not educators, and the concept of a reluctant 
salesperson soon proved to be as chimerical as the dream of a nation 
without a thirst.”27  Much of the SEC’s efforts, both in this period and after 
1954, seemed focused on creating incentives for issuers to distribute the 
material in final prospectus before the time for delivery specified in the 
statute.  The statute, from its origin, has permitted free writing after the 
effective date once the investor has received the final prospectus28 and the 
SEC in the pre-1954 period pursued a number of efforts to condition sales 
efforts prior to the effective date on receipt of all or almost all of the 
information in what would be the final prospectus by permitting a red 
herring prospectus, identifying statements or other communications.29  In a 
legislative process cutoff by the advent of World War II, the SEC staff 
proposed legalizing the red herring selling effort based on a condition 
precedent of the investors’ receipt of a statutory prospectus before 
committing to the sale.30  But the time the discussion resumed after the war, 
the SEC staff had let go of the condition precedent while accepting the legal 
recognition of the red herring.  Even then, the SEC chair floated the 
possibility of conditioning acceleration of a registration statement on all 
prospective and actual selling group members receiving a red herring 
                                                          
25 James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 29, 35 (1959-60). 
26 15 U.S.C. §77e(b)(2). 
27 LOSS 2D ED., supra, note 21 at 187. 
28 15 U.S.C. §2(a) (10) (excluding free writing from definition of prospectus after the 
effective date). 
29  See LOSS 2D ED., supra note 21, at 187-193. 
30 Id. at 199-200.  Loss describes the industry’s response: permit sales immediately upon 
the effective date subject to an investor’s right to rescission in the day after the sale if the 
purchaser had not received the final prospectus before the sale. 
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prospectus, a filtration-encouraging requirement that made its way into later 
rules.31  Professor Loss, a participant in those SEC staff discussions as a 
senior staff attorney, concluded that recognizing the red-herring prospectus 
for the selling document it is was “a decided improvement in the investor’s 
protection even without his being guaranteed a prospectus for a minimum 
period in advance of his commitment.”32  
Yet, testimony at hearings for the 1954 legislation was that the 
ordinary non–institutional investors “hardly ever” saw a red herring 
prospectus and for many an identifying statement either.33  The larger issue, 
that was already visible in this first period, was the ability of issuers to do 
the selling they needed without the final prospectus or the red herring/ 
identifying statement alternatives, something they could do by oral 
communications unregulated by the ’33 Act.  Loss pointed to the “inability 
or the unwillingness of the Commission to effectively enforce the 
prohibition against pre-effective oral solicitation” by means of interstate 
telephone calls as a difficulty with the ‘pre-54 statute.34  Prior to the passage 
of the ’54 amendments he described the state of affairs as “so prevalent, 
[that] there is real danger that an important feature of the Securities Act“ the 
ban on communications that is our focus, “will become another Prohibition 
law.”35 
Why then would the SEC be willing to agree to a legislative change 
in 1954 that accepted more selling (not just in red herrings but also oral 
communications) without getting actual delivery of the statutory prospectus 
before the investor made the purchase decision?  It would be possible to see 
this as reflecting a change in the political climate.  This was the first time 
since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 that Republicans controlled 
both the White House and the Congress.  Yet the core decision on this point 
had been made years before when Democrats still controlled the 
                                                          
31 Caffrey supra note 24 at 6.  This later became part of Securities Act Release #4968 
(April 24, 1969).  See also  LOSS  2D ED., supra note 21, at 200 “The theory was that the 
very imposition of the twenty-four hour requirement would act as a powerful incentive to 
dissemination of the statutory prospectus during the waiting period.” 
32 Id. at 254-55. 
33 Hearings before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7550 and S. 
2846, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) at 149-50, 158. 
34 Loss 2D ED., supra note 21  at 194. 
35 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION (1951) at 255 (hereinafter “LOSS 1st Ed.,”)  
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Commission.36 When the Eisenhower administration did arrive, it focused 
more on budget restraint than seeking deregulatory changes in the securities 
laws.37  The Republican SEC chairman termed the ’54 legislation “modest 
housekeeping” changes and couldn’t recall “any serious discussion of 
substantive legislative initiatives during his chairmanship.”38  Alternatively 
it could have been an adjustment in the SEC’s attitude toward filtration.  
Loss suggested that the Commission and its staff in 1941 and 1947 may 
have put too much emphasis on the prospectus as the principal tool of the 
disclosure philosophy, pointing instead to “other statutory and 
administrative reforms which might make for a greater measure of pre-
commitment disclosure indirectly.”39 It seems more likely that what we see 
is some recognition of the tradeoff between investor protection and selling 
that carries into the later periods.  It was not just a trust in filtration and 
markets to sufficiently transmit the information that had been given to the 
SEC, but recognition of the value of information going the other way from 
purchasers to underwriters.  
In discussing underwriter’s use of oral solicitation at a time that 
selling was banned by statute, Loss describes the practice as based on the 
underwriters’ conviction (and adds “perhaps correctly so”) that “it was 
essential to the fulfillment of their function, at least if it was to be done with 
reasonable safety, that they test the market before committing 
themselves.”40  Here is the precursor to the book building argument that 
didn’t make its way into the legal literature for decades into the future.  
Underwriters who were buying from the issuer and taking the risk of the 
                                                          
36 LOSS 1ST ED., supra note 35, at 251 (“After five years this difference [referring to the 
Commission’s and the industry’s views in the 1941 -2 period discussed above] no longer 
seemed so vital.”) 
37 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003) at 267 
(describing drop in the number of SEC staff.) 
38 Id. at 271-272. 
39  LOSS 2D ED., supra note 21, at 203. 
40 Id. at 194.  The “perhaps correctly so” was an addition to Loss’s second edition, 
published in 1961.  In the first edition in 1951, then SEC lawyer Loss quoted a SEC 
commissioner characterizing the underwriters’ action as “probably not with their hearts in 
their mouth, but doubtless with their tongues in their cheeks.” LOSS 1st Ed., supra note 35 at 
161, quoting Address by Commissioner McConnaughey at Amos Tuck School of Business 
Administration, January 22, 1948. 
 See also, Nathan D. Lobell, Revision of the Securities Act, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 313, 332 
(1948) (gun jumping “stemmed from desire by underwriters to limit period of their risk of 
less than full distribution”). 
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uncertainty as to the price at which they could resale an issue for which 
there was no pre-existing market information wanted to communicate with 
buyers before they committed to a purchase price with the issuer.  They did 
it orally with nothing more than indications of interest that were not legally 
binding, relying on reputation to make the process work for both sides.41   
Paul Mahoney notes that none of the prohibitions on 
communications were necessary in order to achieve the simple goal of 
requiring full disclosure.  He prefers a rent-seeking explanation as the 
source of the ban on communications, pointing to the origins of “beating the 
gun” concerns in the 1920s before there were any federal securities laws 
when syndicates sought to ban selling efforts prior to an agreed upon date:  
“While traditionally described as mere pieces of the technical apparatus of 
full disclosure, these provisions imposed important limitations on both retail 
and wholesale competitors…best understood as a means to eliminate 
several specific competitive techniques that low-status securities dealers 
were successfully using against high-status dealers in the late 20s and early 
30s.”42  If such rent-seeking occurred, it was fairly quickly undercut by 
industry participants occupying undefined space beginning in the immediate 
aftermath of the passage of the ’33 Act, asserting as legitimate 
communications practices seemingly banned by the ’33 Act and 
aggressively negotiating with the Commission over two decades to shape 
the law contrary to the initial statute.  The result reflected greater space for 
selling prior to the effective date that permitted price discovery, with more 
practical safeguards against high pressure sales codified into the 1954 
amendments.  
 
B. Oral Communications and Broadened “Prospectus-Like” 
Communications Sanctioned by the 1954 Amendments 
 
With the 1954 legislative amendments, which remains the statutory 
language still applicable today, the categorical ban on communications 
receded entirely from the waiting period and only applies to the pre-filing 
                                                          
41 Loss 2D ED.,  supra note 21 at 194. 
42  Mahoney, supra note 3. 
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period.43  The waiting period was opened to oral communication and greater 
written communication was permitted through a preliminary prospectus, the 
summary prospectus, tombstone ads, and an identifying statement.44 
In the aftermath of the amendments providing new freedom for 
selling activities prior to the effective date, the regulatory focus shifted to 
the perils of high pressure selling prior to the filing of the registration 
statement and the use of mass media to do it.  Speeches by SEC 
commissioners discussed appropriate factors to govern efforts to root out 
communications that would frustrate the purpose of the securities laws.45  In 
late 1957 the Commission issued a release with 10 examples that found its 
way into law school casebooks for decades into the future.  The release 
clearly described its motivation as an effort to overcome what “apparently is 
not generally understood … that the publication of information and 
statements, and publicity efforts generally, made in advance of a proposed 
financing, although not couched in terms of an express offer, may in fact 
contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the 
issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner that raised serious 
question whether the publicity is not in fact part of a selling effort.”46   
Then in the fall of 1958, the Commission brought its first gun 
jumping proceeding since the 1954 changes.47  An underwriter’s publicizing 
Arvida Corporation’s land developments plans that would be the basis of 
the issuer’s public offering was criticized for only presenting the positive 
side of the development plans.  The Commission’s formal opinion which 
followed the settlement of an injunction case and dismissal of an 
                                                          
43 Language from 5(a) was moved to (c). See Chiappinelli, supra note 7. 
44  The original language banning offers to sell used categorical language (“by prospectus 
or otherwise”) that would sweep in oral communications as well as written 
communications  if occurring by means of interstate commerce.  In 1954 that language was 
simply shifted to a new section (c) where it only applied to the pre-filing period.  That left 
section, 5(b)(1) to regulate selling efforts during the waiting period and its language was 
not as broad, only applying to “prospectus” with no mention of “or otherwise.”  Since 
prospectus is limited in §2(a)(10) to only written, and not oral communications, oral offers, 
after 1954,  find their way into the unregulated zone.  
45 See Speech of Commissioner Orrick in 1957 (discussing” thinly veiled attempts”) and 
Chairman Gadsby in 1958 (companies don’t have to close PR departments). 
46 Securities Act Release #3844 (Oct. 8, 1957). 
47 There had been only three SEC actions regarding gun jumping prior to 1954 and only 
one that would fit post-1954 structure focused on conditioning the market in the prefiling 
period. See Loss 2D ED., supra note 21, at 197-97. 
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administrative proceeding cited the direction in the Congressional 
Committee Report from the 1954 legislation for the SEC to be “ever 
vigilant to prevent evasion of the basic statutory approach of full 
disclosure.”48  This sentiment continued to guide SEC policy for decades 
visible in the Google IPO in 2004 when the founders’ interview published 
in Playboy magazine shortly before filing threatened to derail the 
company’s IPO because of concern about a gun jumping communication.49  
In the period after Arvida, the SEC’s communications’ shifted to 
making room for increasing information coming into the marketplace under 
disclosures required by the 1934 Act and to permit information directed 
toward customers, suppliers and employees.50 The Wheat Report in 1969 
expressed the concern that gun jumping had unnecessarily interfered with 
normal publication activities of companies.51  Thereafter the Commission 
amended existing rules and added several new rules liberalizing 
communications.52  The changes reflected the Commission’s belief that 
“widespread market following greatly lessens the potential for abuse section 
5 was intended to prevent.”53 The specific context was the integrated 
disclosure system’s impact on securities issuance by companies that were 
already within the disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act, but they also 
reflected acceptance of the impact of market disclosures and the greater role 
of institutional investors that could also impact issuances in an initial public 
offering, particularly as technology opened up more channels for 
information through the internet and other electronic communications. 
During this period, the SEC continued its prior efforts to more 
broadly disseminate the required disclosure of the final prospectus.  Its 1970 
promulgation of Rule 15c2-8 comes as close as securities law has ever 
come to requiring that investors actually receive a copy of the full story in 
                                                          
48 In re Carl M. Loeb Rhoads & Co., 38 SEC 843 (1959).  
49 See Eric Schmidt, How I Did It: Google’s CEO on the Enduring Lesson of a Quirky IPO, 
Harv. Bus. Rev.  (May 2010)  (the Playboy interview “almost derailed the whole process.” 
available at http://hbr.org/2010/05/how-i-did-it-googles-ceo-on-the-enduring-lessons-of-a-
quirky-ipo/ar/pr). The solution, to add the interview as an appendix to the SEC filing 
fulfilled the full disclosure part of Section 5 without any apparent cooling off period that 
might address conditioning the market concerns. 
50 See e.g. Rule 169, 17 CFR §230.169. 
51 SEC, Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies under the ’33 and 
’34 Securities Acts (1969) at 127. 
52 Securities Act Release 5180 (1971) (amending Rule 135 and adopting Rules 137-139). 
53 Release adopting Rule 139 and adding 139(b) (1984).  
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the statutory prospectus prior to making the decision to buy,.54  This rule 
requires broker-dealers to deliver a copy of the preliminary prospectus to 
any person expected to receive a confirmation of sale at least 48 hours prior 
to anticipated mailing a confirmation.55  Yet this implementation of getting 
out the full disclosure which had been discussed by securities regulators for 
decades occurs in a somewhat convoluted way, not as part of a 1933 Act 
rule-making but as part of 1934 Act provisions regulating the deceptive acts 
of broker-dealers more generally. 
Industry practices continued to develop that focused on 
communications outside of the regulated channels.  Road shows permitted 
issuers and the selling group to both sell and get feedback from potential 
purchasers about their interest and the price they would be willing to pay.56  
When advances in communications technology permitted road show 
presentations to be distributed to those that could not be physically present, 
the SEC deemed these communications not be a prospectus.57 
The finance literature was quicker than the legal literature to connect 
these changes in communications policy to book building and the economic 
function of price discovery in the IPO process, with the underwriter acting 
as a reputational intermediary between issuers and investors as discussed in 
Part II.58  While there remains debate in the finance and legal community 
about the reach of these theories, the unwillingness of the SEC to 
implement a broad ban on communication reflects recognition of the value 
of price discovery.   
Underpricing is a more visible illustration of this tension between 
communications and the process of price discovery in the IPO process.  
Although there were a couple of isolated references to underpricing in the 
                                                          
54 Securities Act Release 5101 (1970).   
55 Rule 15c2-8(b). Other parts of the rule also require brokers and dealers to take 
reasonable steps to furnish take reasonable steps to comply with written requests for the 
preliminary or final prospectus and to those expected to solicit customer orders. 
56 See Bro Utal, Inside the Deal That Made Bill Gates $350,000,000, Fortune July 21 1986 
23, 32 (describing six big investors threatening to ‘uncircle”- to remove themselves from 
Goldman Sachs list two days before the deal became effective. “Chicago and Baltimore 
were fraying at the edges,”  but West coast investors stood firm and the IPO went public at 
the $21 that Goldman had told investors was the target price. 
57 See e.g. Exploration, Inc. No Action Letter (October 9, 1986). 
58 See e.g. William Wilhelm, Bookbuilding, Auctions and the Future of the IPO Process, 
17 J. App. Corp. Fin. 2 (2005). 
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legal literature as far back as the 1940s, it was not until the mid 1980s that 
the topic seemed to reach a critical mass of attention in the legal literature.59  
Some of the discussion of this era tracked the idea put forward earlier of the 
underwriter’s risk in making a market that can be reduced by underpricing, 
with a sometimes recurring theme that underwriters were taking advantage 
of the process.60  Even so, the legal literature was a good ways behind the 
finance discussion of book building and underpricing’s relation to the 
underwriter’s price discovery process in discussions with buyers based on 
the underwriter’s role as a reputational intermediary, to be  discussed in Part 
II.   
 
C.  The 2005 Reforms 
 
By the turn of the most recent century, many accommodations had 
been made to the practicalities of book-building, but the 1954 revisions 
were still amply visible in establishing the basic regulatory framework for 
IPOs.  Gun-jumping liability remained a significant threat, at least as 
enforced (with considerable discretion) by the SEC staff.  In 2005, however, 
there was something of a revolution. 
The 2005 reforms were decades in the making, largely driven by the 
frustration of applying the stringent public offering rules to seasoned issuers 
when so much information is already available about them as a result of 
their public company status under the Securities Exchange Act.61  
Fortunately we can ignore most of these reforms for our discussion, either 
because they do not apply to IPOs or, even if they do, because they do not 
involve Section 5’s communication rules. 
Two major changes, however, did significantly affect the IPO 
process—one for the pre-filing period, the other post-filing.  New Rule 
163A created a limited 30-day window prior to the filing of the registration 
                                                          
59 See Barbara Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Market and Shelf Registration: An 
Analysis of Rule 415, 70 Va. L. Rev. 135 at footnote 82 (1984) (discussing underwriter 
incentives to underprice ; Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, at note 197 (1984). 
60 Banoff, supra note 59.  
61  2005 Release, supra note 9 at 44724. 
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statement during which the quiet period attaches; offering communications 
by the issuer (not underwriters or dealers) before that time are excluded 
from the definition of offer, and hence from the prohibition in Section 
5(c).62  In other words, the duration of the pre-filing period is shortened 
considerably, and issuers are free to “hype” up until the appointed time so 
long as their communications do not reference the forthcoming public 
offering and efforts are made to assure that the publicity is not repeated 
within the 30-day period.63 
The SEC’s explanation was that hyping that occurs more than thirty 
days out is unlikely to have an on-going conditioning effect on investors by 
the time they make their decisions to buy.64  While the Commission is no 
doubt right that publicity’s effects do dissipate over time, we can at least 
wonder whether concerted efforts to create a buzz about a company and its 
prospects don’t have lingering effects in terms of follow up word-of-mouth, 
journalistic coverage, etc.  It may be naïve to think that publicity that whets 
the appetite of potential investors ceases to have that effect so quickly.  
Even though there is the prohibition on referencing the forthcoming 
offering, the issuer has the freedom to make such an announcement 
separately pursuant to long-standing Rule 135—the market for IPOs can 
then easily make the connection.65 
The other major reform affecting IPO communications—one of the 
headline changes in the 2005 revisions—was the authorization for the issuer 
and offering participants to use “free writing prospectuses” (“FWP”) after 
the filing of a registration statement containing a bona fide expected price 
range.66  FWPs are written marketing material of any sort—e-mails, term 
sheets, sales literature, media publicity.67  The relevant safe harbor rules 
(Rules 164 and 433) are mind-numbingly complicated but boil down to 
three possibilities, depending on who is responsible for the material and 
how or to whom it is communicated: (1) the inclusion of a legend warning 
readers that a prospectus is/will be available and should be read; (2) 
attachment of the most recent preliminary prospectus, which may be via 
                                                          
62  17 CFR §230.163A. 
63  17 CFR §230.163A(a). 
64  Id. at 44740. 
65  17 CFR §230.135. 
66  17 CFR §230.164. 
67  17 CFR §230.405. 
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hyperlink for electronic materials; and (3) filing with the SEC.68  This is 
truly “free writing” in that there are no limitations on what can be said or 
how it can be communicated, so long as there is no inconsistency with what 
is in the registration statement.   
This is a vast oversimplification of the FWP regime,69 but enough 
for our purposes.  What is amply clear is the SEC had abandoned its 1954 
philosophy that had tried to make the preliminary prospectus and similar 
documents the only written communications containing the kind of 
information that could make an investor want to purchase up until the 
effective date.  The new philosophy was one of free communication (albeit 
with some combination of the three conditions) of whatever the offering 
participants want to say, so long as the best available prospectus is available 
to counter any overly optimistic implications from the FWPs.   
The SEC was unapologetic about this profound change, making 
clear that the passage of time and evolution in information technology had 
made the old oral/written distinction both anachronistic and unwise.70  This 
reform unleashed opportunities for much more aggressive selling efforts 
during the waiting period.  Acknowledging this, the Commission said that 
any excesses should be curbed not by prior restraint but by the threat of 
liability if what is said in the FWP is actually false or misleading.71  To this 
end, the 2005 reforms revised the liability rules under Section 12(a)(2) of 
the Securities Act, a provision that allows purchasers to recover against 
their sellers if sales are made, negligently, by means of a false or misleading 
“prospectus or oral communication.”72 Notably, the reforms purported to 
                                                          
68  17 CFR §230.433 
69  For more, see COX ET AL. supra note 2, at 168-70.   
70  2005 Release, supra note 9, at 44744. 
71  See Securities Lawyer Predicts Success for Forthcoming SEC Offering Rule Proposals,   
36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1894 (quoting Alan Beller, the Director of the Division of 
Corporation Finance, as saying that “so long as there are liability standards for material 
misstatements and material omissions in all written statements, the restrictions on written 
communications should not have to be as tight as they currently are.”) 
72 17 CFR §230.159A (defining “to offer to sell” to include an issuer offering or selling by 
means of a free writing prospectus prepared on behalf of the issuer or sued by the issuer). 
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expand issuer liability, even when the issuer is a step or two removed from 
the plaintiff-purchaser.73  We will come back to all this in Part III.   
We will turn soon to whether all this is good policy or not.  For now, 
simply appreciate the extraordinary turn away from the statutory structure 
created in 1954.  Until 2005, the IPO lawyer’s job was often simply to say 
no to an issuer or underwriter that wanted to promote the forthcoming 
offering in a way that ran afoul of Sections 5(b) or 5(c)—any selling efforts 
before filing, and written solicitations afterwards.  Now, except in the brief 
thirty day window prior to filing, the desired selling efforts could occur, 
with the lawyer simply assessing whether the communication needed a 
legend or attachment, had to be filed, or was false or misleading.  The 
edifice built in 1954—itself a compromise from what had been enacted in 
1933—had largely been torn down. 
 
D.  The JOBS Act Relief for Emerging Growth Companies 
 
The 2005 reforms barely had time to become familiar before the 
financial collapse and global recession destabilized much of finance.  As the 
U.S. struggled to regain its economic vigor, efforts to promote capital 
formation and hoped-for job creation became a priority for the nation’s 
lawmakers.  The JOBS Act of 2012 was a largely bipartisan response that 
specifically sought to encourage more IPOs by eliminating some of the 
regulatory burdens new public issuers face under both the ’33 and ’34 
Acts—building a so-called “on-ramp” for issuers that qualify as emerging 
growth companies (“EGCs”).74    
                                                          
73  Rule 159A; see COX ET AL., supra note 2 at 538-39.  The reforms also made “time of 
sale” the measure for assessing whether solicitation material was false or misleading, not 
any subsequent filings. 
74 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra, note 11.  Section 101 added §2(a)(19) to the ’33 
Act,  defining emerging growth companies as revenue with less than $1 billion.  The vast 
majority of IPO issuers fall into the EGC category.  For a thorough set of data and 
commentary, see LATHAM & WATKINS, THE JOBS ACT AFTER ONE YEAR: A REVIEW OF 
THE NEW IPO PLAYBOOK (April 5, 2013), available at http://www.lw.com/news/jobs-act-
at-one-release (hereinafter “Latham & Watkins report”).  See also ERNST & YOUNG, THE 
JOBS ACT: ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY (April 2013). 
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As with the 2005 reforms, we can ignore much of this deregulation.  
To be sure, there are aspects of the IPO deregulation that are controversial 
and deserve close attention, like the invitation for new issuers to make a 
confidential filing of their registration statement.  But they do not involve 
Section 5’s communication rules, and so are not our concern here. 
There are two major changes that do.  The first, in new Section 5(d), 
is the authorization for both issuers and offering participants to 
communicate in the pre-filing period with accredited institutional investors 
in order to “test the waters” before committing to a public offering.75  This 
goes well beyond the 2005 reforms because it enables conversations that 
focus specifically on the possible offering, and invites underwriters to take 
part.  This is a moderate reform insofar as it limits contacts to those with 
presumably sophisticated institutions.  It can be seen as a form of pre-book-
building, though no doubt the intention is to allow conversations with key 
investors as to whether the offering is worth doing in the first place. 
The second is far more interesting, and requires a bit of background.  
Broker-dealer firms have long provided so-called sell-side research on 
publicly-traded companies, including recommendations to buy, sell, or hold.  
Were research to be initiated at the time of an IPO, it would presumably 
violate Section 5, as a written “offer” by an underwriter or dealer, whether 
or not the research was published by a deal participant.76   
For offerings by seasoned issuers, the SEC has for some time had 
safe harbor rules that enable research to occur or continue even though a 
public offering is taking place.  The most sensitive of these is Rule 139, 
which sets the conditions under which even underwriters—with an obvious 
self-interest in promoting the offering—can continue to publish research.77  
But Rule 139 has never been available with respect to IPOs.78  Around the 
time the tech-stock bubble burst a little more than a decade ago, ample 
evidence arose that underwriters were using the promise of favorable 
research coverage as a means of obtaining investment banking business but 
harming purchasers.  The resulting scandals led to a variety of restrictions 
designed to build a “wall” between research and banking.  Research by deal 
                                                          
75 15 USC §77e(d). 
76  As of 2005, such research publications could presumably be a free writing prospectus. 
77  See COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 186-88. 
78 17 CFR §230.179(b) (applied to issuers required to file periodic reports under the 1934 
Act). 
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participants was impermissible until the offering was complete and (by 
FINRA rule) insider lock-ups had expired.79   
Whether all this was something of an over-reaction is debatable.80  
Positive research does make issuers more visible to investors, supporting a 
higher market valuation.  The overall decline in the number of analysts 
covering smaller issuers, particularly after the introduction of 
decimalization reduced spreads in traded stocks, has sometimes been cited 
as a reason for the decline in IPOs.  The IPO community took the JOBS Act 
as an opportunity to seek relief, and Congress delivered.  Research analysts 
were given the freedom to take more of a role in discussions with potential 
issuers, and underwriters and other deal participants could initiate coverage 
at the time of the offering.81   
This was controversial enough—obviously, the pressure on analysts 
will be to help sell the stock and support the after-market.  But those 
conflicts are fully disclosed, and other regulatory restrictions remain in 
place, so that the precise effects to this new form of sales pressure are hard 
to estimate.82  We can almost certainly put this reform in the category of 
trading lower investor protection for enhanced capital formation, but it is 
not clear by how much.  But the controversy over this amply visible 
deregulation almost completed obscured a much bigger impact on Section 
5.   
The proponents of enhanced sell-side research at the time of an 
offering wanted to promote oral as well as published research.  For this the 
standard regulatory safe-harbor description of research then in use would 
not work—the SEC had, as recently as the 2005 reforms, refused to extend 
the safe-harbors to oral dissemination of recommendations.83  Instead, the 
JOBS Act alters the definition of both “offer” and “prospectus” (the key 
words in Section 5) to exclude a research report, with research report then 
                                                          
79  17 CFR §230.139; Cox et al., supra note 2, at 135-36, 1039-41. 
80  See Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 
39 (2007).  There has been significant evidence of a reduction in the research coverage of 
smaller issuers since the reforms went into effect. 
81  15 USC 77e(3) (publication by a broker or dealer of a research report about an emerging 
growth company is not a prospectus or offer). 
82  Some finance scholars called into question whether recommendations by conflicted 
analysts distorted stock prices in the first place.  See Agrawal & Chen, Do Analyst 
Conflicts Matter: Evidence from Stock Recommendations, 51 J. L. & Econ. 503 (2008). 
83  2005 Release, at 44762. 
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defined to mean any “written, electronic, or oral communication [by a 
broker or dealer] that includes information, opinions or recommendations 
with respect to the securities of an [EGC] . . . whether or not it provides 
information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment 
decision.”84   
One can see how this might seem necessary to authorize the oral 
communication of sell-side research, and the phrase referring to “reasonably 
sufficient” simply takes from language drafted by the SEC in 2005.85  But 
step back and ask whether there any form of salesmanship by an offering 
participant—even e-mail spam—that is not effectively eliminated from 
Section 5 when the issuer is an EGC.  If read literally, this takes out of 
Section 5’s communication rules the very sort of action that section is most 
concerned with: sales efforts to whet the appetite of investors, whether pre-
filing or during the waiting period.  With respect to underwriters and 
dealers, it leaves Section 5(b) and (c) an empty shell. 
All this was largely missed in the immediate aftermath of the JOBS 
Act.86  Once the SEC realized what had happened, it engaged in non-
acquiescence,87 apparently believing that Congress’ intent could not have 
been such a thorough gutting of the statute.  We will have to see how all this 
eventually plays out, but in a world of textualist statutory interpretation, it is 
hard to see how Congress’ words mean anything except what they literally 
say.  To this point, the industry has been cautious in using the new freedom 
it was given as a result of the research rule reforms—other parts of the 
securities laws permit the SEC and FINRA to respond to overreaching 
here—but the potential breadth of the change is startling.88 
                                                          
84  Section 2(a)(3) of the ’33 Act. 
85  2005 Release, supra note 9 at 44762.  This contrasts with other forms of the regulation 
of analyst research, like Section 15D(d) of the ’34 Act, 15 USC §77o-6 (d) and the SEC’s 
Regulation A-C, 17 CFR §242.501 et seq., which refer to reports that are sufficient on 
which to base an investment recommendation.  While the more expansive permission 
granted by revised Rule 139 was not very well explained, it was clearly designed to free up 
less formal selling activity. 
86  The issue is discussed in COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 160. 
87  See Latham & Watkins report, supra note 74, , at 13. 
88  Practitioners have good cause to be cautious and so we do not want to overclaim here.  
Among other things, many of the analyst research rules still apply, and this has been a high 
visibility enforcement area for the SEC.  In addition, FINRA rule 2210 regulates customer 
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E. Summary 
 
 Even if we put aside the JOBS Act research reforms, Section 5 is 
now a far different, less fearsome restraint on the IPO selling process than it 
once was.  It reflect a faith that selling efforts are not so troubling as long as 
a preliminary or final prospectus is available to the potential investor and/or 
the investment professionals involved on both the sell and buy sides.  We 
are thus left with the question of whether Section 5’s slow death—and the 
more vigorous selling efforts that have evolved—should trouble us.  
 
II.  EVALUATING SECTION 5’S DEMISE 
 
 A.  The Economics of IPOs 
 
 IPOs can be promoted much more aggressively in light of the 
changes detailed in Part I.  Determining whether this is problematic best 
begins by looking at the economics of the IPO process, one of the most 
thoroughly-studied subjects in finance.   
 Almost by definition, an IPO is about price formation in the absence 
of a fair interplay of supply and demand that sets an equilibrium market 
price.  That is to say, up to the time of trading (and probably a while 
thereafter), there is no reliable objective measure of the value of the 
security, and in all likelihood substantial subjective disagreement.89  So a 
                                                                                                                                                   
communications that would apply to the kinds of communications seemingly excluded 
from “offer” and “prospectus.”  See id.   
89  There are trading markets for non-public issuers, but to this point it does not appear that 
they offer enough depth and liquidity to offer a reliable market price.  See Langevoort & 
Thompson, supra note 11; Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 179 (2012).  All this might change in the future, in which case there might be 
opportunities to take advantage of private markets as IPO substitutes.  See A.C. Pritchard, 
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demand curve has to be created, and book-building—eliciting non-binding 
bids from sophisticated institutional investors as a result of the sequence of 
closed road shows and private communications—is the dominant solution to 
how to go about finding the optimal fixed offering price.90   
 One of the enduring puzzles in finance has to do with the predictable 
underpricing of IPOs as an artifact of book-building.  Over the past decades, 
with a high degree of regularity, the short-term secondary market price rises 
after the effective date, often considerably—the so-called “pop” in the stock 
price.  That suggests that the fixed offering price could have been higher, so 
that the issuer has left money on the table by not taking sufficient advantage 
of the demand for its securities.  We have to be careful here, because the 
prevailing market price reflects the demand for single shares rather than the 
amount that it would take to find enough buyers to take the issuer’s entire 
supply.  But even so, the magnitude of the underpricing requires 
explanation.   
 The standard account is informational, which is often put forward to 
justify the entire enterprise of book-building.  Institutional investors have 
private information—the product of their own proprietary research as well 
as their own demand preferences—that is costly to reveal.  They will not be 
open and candid with the underwriters unless given a credible commitment 
that they will be compensated, and so book-building will fail.  Underpriced 
allotments are the solution: the underwriters make an implicit promise that 
in this or subsequent offerings they will be paid for the value of the 
information embedded in their bids, based on how forthcoming and 
aggressive they are.  Because underwriters and these large institutions deal 
with each other repeatedly, reputational incentives suffice.   
 Here the controversy begins.  Accepting this basic premise, is the 
underpricing no more than necessary to induce the key investors’ candor 
and participation?  Although underwriters are formally limited to their 7% 
spread in terms of their own compensation, they might be able to favor their 
repeat institutional customers by underpricing more aggressively and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Revisiting “Truth in Securities Revisited:” Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private 
Markets for Public Good, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 999 (2013). 
90  See Lawrence Benveniste & Paul Spindt, How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer 
Price and Allocations of New Securities, 24 J. Fin. Econ. 343 (1989); see also Wilhelm, 
supra note 58. 
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getting soft dollar kickbacks in return.91  The IPO scandals in the aftermath 
of the tech stock bubble a little more than a decade ago exposed some of 
these temptations.92 But won’t issuers—who are hardly unsophisticated—
learn to resist this exploitation?  Maybe not, for a variety of reasons.  
Perhaps there is collusive behavior by the securities industry that makes 
issuer resistance difficult, or maybe underpricing is palatable to the issuer 
because it provides some insurance against the draconian liability that the 
Securities Act generates.  The most common explanation, however, is that 
the issuer’s insiders see personal profit opportunity in the underpricing 
because the “pop” may enable greater profits when they sell their own 
shares later on, when lock-up agreements expire.93   
 These are not Section 5 problems, however, at least not directly.  If 
book-building is about a delicate negotiation between the underwriters and 
institutional investors leading to systematic underpricing of IPOs, we need 
not worry about these investors.  While there will be retail investors as well 
in the initial round of sales, the fixed-price offering means they will get the 
same mark-down as the institutions.  Thus, in the absence of retail-only 
IPOs, we might reasonably wonder why we need Section 5’s sales 
restrictions at all.  Institutional investors presumably do not need to be told 
to wait and read the prospectus before deciding to invest if they find that 
information necessary or valuable (which certainly justifies the JOBS Act’s 
new Section 5(d)).   
 We may have to be somewhat cautious here, however.  One of the 
insights of the economics literature is that underwriters and preferred 
customers (the major institutions) are repeat players whose interactions 
extend among many offerings.  An institution might make a generous bid in 
one offering with the expectation that it is helping out the underwriters now, 
expecting compensation in other ways or other deals.  So, we cannot be 
entirely confident that the institutional pricing mechanism assures fairness 
in any given deal.  Moreover, institutions can exit fairly quickly in the 
aftermarket, relying on the underpricing for short-term protection.94  While 
                                                          
91  See Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. Fin. 285 (2000); 
see also William K. Sjostrom, The Untold Story of Underwriting Compensation 
Regulation, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 625 (2010). 
92  See sources in note [X] supra. 
93  E.g., Daniel Bradley et al., The Quiet Period Goes Out with a Bang, 58 J. Fin. 1 (2003). 
94 See Thomas Chemmanur et al., The Role of Institutional Investors in Initial Public 
Offerings, 23 Rev. Fin. Stud. 4496 (2010) (institutional sell approximately 70% of their 
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underwriters naturally want to discourage too much early flipping, this is all 
negotiable. 
 In any event, the major Section 5 problems are less likely to arise 
from book-building solicitations than from the impact of the offering on 
secondary market trading.95  Under-pricing is a function of the difference 
between the fixed offering price and the likely after-market price; the higher 
the latter, the more valuable the allocations.  For that reason alone, 
underwriters will try to stimulate investor demand beyond the initial round 
of buyers.  Moreover, a threat to include more retail investors in a 
particularly hot offering might encourage the institutions to be more 
generous in their book-building bids.  To the extent that issuer insiders are 
anxious to take advantage of lock-up expirations occurring a while after the 
effective date, they, too, will reward underwriters who work to stimulate 
secondary market demand.  Recent empirical evidence supports the idea 
that such stimulation is part of the underwriters’ job, for which they are well 
compensated.96 The evolution of social media (Twitter, Facebook, 
Linkedin, etc.) has expanded the mechanisms for doing this. 
 Assessing this is difficult, however, because offering participants are 
hardly the sole cause of positive investor sentiment in anticipation of an 
IPO.  The financial media covets emerging growth company stories, 
especially among issuers with visible brand names, and can hype without 
prompting.  Investor enthusiasm can spread virus-like by word of mouth or 
the electronic equivalent, amply visible through simple tools like counting 
Google searches for pre-IPO issuers.97  Identifying or measuring how much 
offering participants induce enthusiasm, then, is impossible in a noisy 
financial marketplace.  But the studies noted above make clear enough that 
efforts in this direction are expected, with compensation that is presumably 
not for nothing. 
                                                                                                                                                   
allocations in the first year, and are rewarded for holding by future allocations); Reena 
Aggarwal, Allocation of Initial Public Offerings and Flipping Activity, 68 J. Fin. Econ. 111 
(2003). 
95  Id.; see also Daniel Bradley et al., The IPO Quiet Period Revisited, 2 J. Inv. Mgt. 
(2004); Pritchard, supra note 89, at 1014-15. 
96  See Douglas O. Cook, et al., On the Marketing of IPOs, 82 J. Fin. Econ. 35 (2006); see 
also Francois Derrien, IPO Pricing in “Hot” Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on 
the Table?, 60 J. Fin. 487 (2005); Alexander Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Investor 
Sentiment and IPO Pricing, 79 J. Bus. 1667 (2006). 
97  See Zhi Da et al., In Search of Attention, 66 J. Fin. 1461 (2011). 
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 A circumstantial case for these IPO marketing practices follows 
from a well-known anomaly: that even though underpricing is clear, in the 
long run IPOs underperform.98  That is to say, the predictable profit 
opportunities may disappear fairly quickly, and investors who buy 
(especially in the aftermarket) and hold IPOs over a longer time horizon do 
not do that well.  There are many explanations given for this, including 
timing (issuers make their IPOs when at the top of their game99), financial 
reporting (issuers take advantage of accounting discretion to maximize their 
current profitability and/or growth at the expense of future reporting) and 
the aggressive marketing of the IPO itself.  The steady increase in the 
supply of stock for sale and borrowing, which facilitates short-selling, also 
puts downward pressure on the price that was missing in the early days of 
trading.  Arguably, sophisticated investors in IPOs may know to get out 
early except when they have confidence they have found one of the 
winners.   
 We have to be careful not to overstate all this.  There is evidence, for 
example, that underperforming IPOs are heavily concentrated at the low 
reputational end of the spectrum, where the institutional presence is 
weakest.100  Nor is it clear that aggressive media coverage necessarily 
correlates with long-run underperformance.101  Thus we cannot simply 
assume the presence of rampant opportunism directed at the retail 
aftermarket.  But we cannot rule it out either, particularly given the cyclical 
variations in capital raising patterns over time. 
 
 B.  Economics Confronts Law 
 
                                                          
98  See Jay Ritter, The Long Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. Fin. 3 
(1991). 
99  See Tim Loughrin & Jay Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. Fin. 23 (1995); see also 
sources cited in note [X] supra. 
100  See Alon Brav & Paul Gompers, Myth or Reality?: The Long Run Underperformance 
of Initial Public Offerings, 52 J. Fin. 1791 (1997); Laura Field & Michelle Lowry, 
Institutional Versus Individual Investment in IPOs: The Importance of Firm Fundamentals, 
65 J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 489 (2009). 
101  See LAURA LIU ET AL., THE LONG-RUN ROLE OF THE MEDIA: EVIDENCE FROM INITIAL 
PUBLIC OFFERINGS (Feb. 2012). 
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 The devolution of Section 5 has plainly made it easier to “pump” 
IPO stocks.  The 2005 reforms, as we have seen, allows even “hyping” 
publicity up until 30 days before the filing of the registration statement so 
long as it does not reference the offering (even though the offering can be 
announced separately), and free writing prospectuses during the waiting 
period can generate mass media publicity with nothing more than a filing 
requirement, as well as more targeted communications via e-mail and the 
internet.  Backdoor hyping mechanisms like product advertising are 
arguably made easier by Rule 169 even within the 30 day window, 
continuing through the waiting period.102  The JOBS Act redefinition of 
“research” within the statutory definition of offer opens up even more 
potential for conditioning the market prior to the effective date; the Act’s 
more explicit instruction that brokers involved in the underwriting can 
initiate research coverage of the EGC immediately, with predictable “buy” 
recommendations, is by all accounts a freedom to pump.    
 None of this will come as any surprise to those familiar with the 
2005 reforms or the JOBS Act, however.  The drafters of both did not deny 
that more aggressive publicity would result; rather, they argue that serious 
abuses are unlikely.  One reason has to do with institutional investors as 
protectors of the retail given that offerings are fixed price.  Another has to 
do with the modern information environment, which gives potential 
investors access to information about issuers from a wealth of sources, 
presumably making public offering fraud harder to perpetrate.  While there 
is no doubt something to the idea that hiding the truth is more difficult 
today than in the past, contemporary frauds like Enron, Worldcom and 
many others show that issuer opacity remains problematic.103  Indeed, 
modern technology can amplify fads and fashions as much as it can expose 
the truth.  Especially without short-selling opportunities to profit from at the 
time of the IPO, the few skeptical voices interested in popping a bubble of 
excitement are likely to be silenced by the din of enthusiasm from those 
anxious for an offering to succeed.  We are thus disinclined to put too much 
faith in this argument. 
                                                          
102  Rule 169 does restrict advertising and other “factual” communications to that which is 
consistent with the issuer’s normal practices.  For evidence on the use of advertising to 
promote public offerings, see Thomas Chemmanur & An Yan, Product Market Advertising 
and New Equity Issues, 92 J. Fin. Econ. 40 (2009). 
103  For an estimate, see ALEXANDER DYCK ET AL., HOW PERVASIVE IS CORPORATE FRAUD? 
(Feb. 2013), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2222608 (inferring that as many as 
14.5% of publicly-traded issuers are engaged in fraud at a given time). 
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 C.  Liability Rules 
 
 The other arguments that fear of opportunism is overblown are 
largely liability-based.  One is that no reform has touched the centerpiece of 
the Securities Act: the registration statement with its extensive disclosures 
about the issuer and the offering, which is publicly available by the time 
serious marketing of the IPO commences and which—as of the effective 
date—must be true and complete lest extraordinarily strict liability ensue.104  
This by itself should be a counterweight to any false or misleading hype, 
which is the only hype worth worrying about.  We come back to this in Part 
III. 
 The other is that there is a set of civil liability and conduct rules that 
can be relied upon to deter overreaching in the marketing of the IPO.  With 
respect to the expansion of research carve-outs in the JOBS Act, for 
example, the drafters point to SEC and FINRA rules that are designed to 
promote analyst independence from pressure from others in the investment 
bank, most of which were untouched in the reforms.  There are also both 
substantive and procedural limits on solicitation efforts—for example, 
“know your security” norms, which require brokers to be familiar with 
issuer-related information before making any recommendations to 
customers,105 and communication rules that require supervisory approval of 
brokers’ written outreach efforts, which now includes social media.106 All 
this relates to a point we have made elsewhere: the Securities Act was 
enacted a few years before the advent of substantive broker-dealer 
regulation, so that maybe the subsequent emergence of those direct controls 
on the selling effort can substitute for the overbroad prophylactics in the 
statute.107 
 There is much to be said for this, and we could imagine a 
technology-enhanced system of real-time surveillance of the sales and 
marketing practices associated with IPOs and other sensitive transactions 
                                                          
104  Section 11 of the Securities Act; see COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 485-515. 
105  Id. at 1033-38. 
106  FINRA Rule 2210; Regulatory Notice 11-39. 
107  See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 1. 
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that would indeed justify relaxation of the statutory rules.  Whether we are 
at such a point is open to question, however.  Our sense is that the pressure 
to market aggressively will find expression in ways that are difficult to 
detect or prove as violations.  For example, analysts doing research do not 
need to have compensation set based on their contributions to the banking 
side to realize that their career prospects are better if they are in synch with 
their employers’ deal flow.  And investment banks can hire optimists for 
this kind of work if there are any doubts, for whom genuine enthusiasm for 
favored stocks comes easily.  We can say the same about brokers doing 
other kinds of hard-sell marketing. 
 But if these softer rules are not powerful enough, maybe other civil 
liability rules are.  The SEC was clear that their philosophy was deregulate 
communications that were not necessarily troublesome and then use ex post 
liability to address the abuses when they are uncovered.  These include SEC 
and FINRA enforcement actions, for which there is ample authority.  
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, for example, creates liability for 
misrepresentations or omissions in the offer or sale of a security, without 
the need to prove intentional misconduct.108  Here again, however, the 
question is whether enforcement resources and detection mechanisms are up 
to the task.   
 Private lawsuits by IPO investors add a larger dimension to the 
policing of abusive marketing practices, to which SOR assigns an important 
role.  Putting aside for a moment situations where the registration statement 
itself is false or misleading as of the effective date, two private rights of 
action can be invoked: Rule 10b-5, and Section 12(a)(2). 
 Rule 10b-5—the general antifraud provision under the federal 
securities laws—is not particularly helpful, however, outside the most 
egregious of IPO cases.  It requires plaintiffs to plead and prove scienter,109 
which is not always easy when offering participants seem caught up in deal 
euphoria.  It also has a challenging “loss causation” standard, whereby 
plaintiffs have to show that their stock price losses were the product of the 
revelation of the truth about what had been misrepresented, rather than other 
economic factors.  High-visibility cases challenging biased investment bank 
research in IPOs have collapsed simply because of this difficulty.110  But 
                                                          
108  See COX ET AL., supra note  2, at 547-50. 
109  That is, proof of intentional or reckless fraud.  See id. at 707-11. 
110  See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch, 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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the most powerful impediment to 10b-5 litigation here is procedural: private 
enforcement by investors has to take the form of a class action to be 
effective, and courts have not been willing to afford plaintiffs the 
presumption of reliance in the IPO context that they do in other open-
market fraud lawsuits because the IPO and immediate aftermarket trading 
does not occur in an sufficiently “efficient” market.111  Without that 
presumption, the class action is simply not certified.   
 This leaves Section 12(a)(2), which the SEC promoted in the 2005 
reforms as the primary response to fear of abusive marketing.112  This 
statutory provision allows buyers of securities to sue their sellers for 
rescissory damages if securities were sold by means of a false or misleading 
“prospectus or oral communication,” subject to a reasonable care 
defense.113  The statutory definition of prospectus refers to any written 
offering material, upon which the Supreme Court put a gloss in the 
Gustafson decision by limiting this category to offering materials used in a 
public offering.114  The 2005 reforms makes clear that in the opinion of the 
SEC, marketing materials used in a registered public offering, including 
free writing prospectuses, satisfy this definition.115  The SEC also adopted a 
number of rules to bolster plaintiffs’ ability to sue.   
 Of these, the most potent relates to the definition of seller, who is 
the only permissible defendant in a 12(a)(2) suit.  The case law had defined 
seller as including only those who passed title to the security to the buyer 
(i.e., one’s immediate seller) and those who solicit on behalf of the seller.  
This creates problems in the context of the firm commitment underwriting, 
because the securities would move from the issuer to the underwriters and 
then perhaps another step or two before coming to rest in the hands of the 
investor who claims abuse.  The SEC took the view that underwriters and 
other offering participants had enough of a seller role to fall within the 
scope of the term as understood by the courts—which itself is a little bit of a 
stretch.  But what about the issuer, which stands at least a step away from 
                                                          
111  In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
112  In his criticism of the SEC’s approach to free writing prospectuses, Thel notes that the 
adopting release refers to 12(a)(2) more than seventy times.  See Steve Thel, Free Writing, 
33 J. Corp. L. 941, 962 n. 99 (2008).   
113  See COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 528-46. 
114   Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
115  See Thel, supra note 112, criticizing the SEC’s approach to 12(a)(2) liability for free 
writing prospectuses that are not widely distributed. 
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the ultimate purchaser?  The case law here was mixed, and so the SEC used 
its definitional rulemaking authority in Rule 159A simply to declare the 
issuer a seller for purposes of 12(a)(2) with respect to marketing material 
for which it bears responsibility.116  With this, the Commission said, victims 
of abusive marketing were protected from any unfortunate consequences of 
Section 5’s partial disappearance.  This would include misrepresentations or 
omissions in the preliminary prospectus, free writing prospectuses, or 
related oral or written solicitations.    
 This is undermined, however, by at least four key weaknesses.  As 
to the widened definition of “seller” in Rule 159A, which is crucial to 
effective policing, a surprisingly large number of courts have been inclined 
to stick with the older case law, often not even mentioning the rule-based 
change.  A few have held that the SEC lacks the authority to change the 
definition.117 This may reflect a tendency observable elsewhere in securities 
litigation, wherein courts are doubtful that the SEC should control the 
sensitive subject of private litigation rights.   
 Beyond this, there is substantial doubt as to whether Section 
12(a)(2) applies to secondary trading as opposed to sales by underwriters 
and dealers as part of the IPO itself.  The “majority opinion” seems to be 
not,118 which means that aftermarket purchasers have no recourse even if 
Rule 159A stands. 
 The next weakness takes us back to the issue of reliance and the ease 
of class certification that has been the subject of so much litigation under 
Rule 10b-5.  It is generally said that Section 12(a)(2) has no reliance 
requirement.119  But that construal dates back to the original idea that 
prospectuses were extremely limited prior to the effective date, so that 
                                                          
116  17 CFR §230.159A.  The Supreme Court has construed the term “seller” in Section 
12(a) to include only the person who transfers title to the security to the purchaser, and any 
other person who, for pecuniary benefit, solicits the transaction.  Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 
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117  See In re Kosmos Energy Sec. Litig., 2013 WL 3196437 (N.D. Tex. 2013); 
Countrywide Fin. Corp. MBS Sec. Litig., 2013 WL 1189311 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Mass. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Residential Funding Co., 843 F. Supp.2d 191 (D. Mass. 2012).  For a 
contrary view, accepting the rule as valid, see Capital Ventures Int’l v. J.P. Morgan 
Mortgage Acquisition Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19227 (D. Mass. 2013). 
118  See Johnson v. Sequans Comm. S.A., 2013 WL 214279 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Rogers v. 
Sterling Foster & Co., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
119  See LOSS ET AL, supra. 
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statutorily-authorized free writing was only really a post-effective 
possibility (where it received an explicit exemption from the definition of 
prospectus ).120  Thus there really was very little role for 12(a)(2) liability at 
all, except with respect to offerings of exempt securities—where the 
offering document was the functional equivalent of the statutory 
prospectus.121  Thus it made sense for there to be no reliance requirement 
(just as there is no reliance requirement under Section 11 for false 
registration statements) because the importance of that document could be 
presumed.  The 2005 reforms, however, radically revised this, inviting all 
kinds of communications of varying degrees of visibility and import.  As a 
matter of common sense, 12(a)(2) will not work without some insistence 
that a buyer trace his or her purchase back to the defective prospectus, and 
the language in the provision that recovery is appropriate when the 
securities were sold “by means of” the false prospectus invites precisely this 
inquiry.122  If so, there could be at least a backdoor reliance requirement.  
And if so, it is highly likely that class certification—the key to effective 
enforcement in private securities litigation—will fail.  If claimants have 
differing reliance explanations, courts may well insist on individualized 
claims, which probably means few or no claims.  To date, class certification 
is still commonplace in 12(a)(2) cases, but largely in contexts where it is a 
tag-a-long to Rule 10b-5 or Section 11 claims.  How much weight it can 
bear on its own is questionable. 
 The final weakness takes us back to the definition of prospectus.  
We will assume that the SEC is right that the definition of prospectus is 
broad enough to include free writing generally.  But there are notable 
exceptions.  The Securities Act explicitly carved out from the definition of 
prospectus any free writing after the effective date that is accompanied or 
preceded by a statutory prospectus.123  More dramatic is the effect of the 
JOBS Act on EGCs.  Any communication by an underwriter or dealer that 
falls in the seemingly broad definition of “research” found in Section 
                                                          
120   The preliminary prospectus would be an exception, of course, but Section 11 
dominates liability here so that where the falsity continued on through the final prospectus, 
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121  See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 1005 (1981) (public offering of commercial paper). 
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2(a)(3) is excluded from being an offer or a prospectus.  Read literally, as 
we have seen, that would put most if not all forms of conditioning the 
market by broker-dealers entirely out of the reach of 12(a)(2).   
 All this suggests that 12(a)(2) may not be a very reliable policing 
mechanism at all, which is troubling given how much stress the SEC put on 
it in 2005.  We suspect that only the SEC and FINRA can realistically 
address abuses in conditioning the market, with the doubts about resources 
and inclination that are inevitable when dealing with public (or quasi-
public) enforcement authority.  To this point, then, there is no compelling 
response to the concern that the slow death of Section 5 puts IPO investors 
more at risk, at least in the secondary market. 
 
III.  THE STATUTORY PROSPECTUS AND THE FILTRATION PROCESS 
 
 The great anomaly of Section 5 has been well-known almost from 
its inception: it seemingly works hard to make the disclosure document (the 
part of the registration statement at the effective date that constitutes the 
final statutory prospectus) an effective truth-telling tool, yet rarely requires 
delivery of it to the investor until after the purchase is complete.124  One 
might justify the death of Section 5 on this basis alone.  But for just as long, 
the reality has been that the work of disclosure is done not by the final 
prospectus but by the preliminary prospectus—a filed draft of the disclosure 
in final-enough form, which sets an offering price range and typically has 
already been revised in response to initial SEC staff comments.125  In 
administering Section 5, the SEC has long insisted on distribution of the 
preliminary prospectus to offering participants and investors who request 
one; in an IPO, moreover, Rule 15c2-8 requires that each purchaser 
expected to buy receive a preliminary prospectus at least 48 hours before 
the sale.  Attachment or linkage of the preliminary prospectus is a condition 
to the use of most free writing during the waiting period.  And if the SEC 
staff comes to think that what is in the preliminary prospectus needs 
                                                          
124  Louis Loss called it a “momento” of the sale.  Thel, supra note 112, says that the 
exception for free writing in the definition of prospectus was designed to compensate for 
this by giving issuers and underwriters an incentive to distribute the final prospectus 
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125  See COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 172-73. 
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significant change, it will delay effectiveness long enough to permit 
recirculation or updating.126 
 This is the real function of the Securities Act, largely untouched by 
the 2005 reforms or the JOBS Act.  The latter does permit confidential 
filings so that the early round of disclosure negotiations with the SEC can 
be kept private, but road shows and other significant marketing steps cannot 
take place until after the “improved” preliminary prospectus has been filed 
publicly.  By all accounts, misrepresentations in this document trigger 
Section 12(a)(2) liability for the seller, albeit subject to the litigation caveats 
stressed earlier.   
 In many ways, the demise of Section 5 that we have traced is most 
readily defended this way.  What is important is high quality disclosure 
throughout the marketing period, so that overbroad marketing restrictions 
are unnecessary and costly.  Those who doubt that many investors actually 
make much use of the disclosure itself generally justify this core set of 
obligations by reference to “filtration”: that what is important during the 
marketing of an IPO is that the professionals be informed of the truth about 
the issuer, so that their recommendations and related activity will reflect 
reality rather than hype.127   
 We don’t doubt that the importance of filtration, even via 
professionals with conflicts of interest (which is a larger category as a result 
of the JOBS Act “research” amendments).  Surely negative or qualified 
facts about a company’s past limit salespeople’s ability to promote 
aggressively.  The problem with the statutory prospectus, preliminary or 
otherwise, is that it is almost entirely historical (backwards-looking) in what 
it reveals, whereas the story that drives the marketing of an IPO is about the 
issuer’s future.  The typical IPO issuer has shown promise; the economics 
literature and common sense suggest that public offerings are timed to take 
advantage of a sense of momentum at a high point in its perceived 
valuation.  What reasonable investors should want to know about is the 
sustainability of this promise and momentum.   
 Litigation under the Securities Act often deals with issuers that 
make public offerings not long before hitting a rough patch—product 
                                                          
126  See John Jenkins, Recirculation of the Preliminary Prospectus: Statutory Basis and 
Analytical Techniques for Resolving Recirculation Issues, 55 Bus. Law. 135 (1999). 
127  See Cox, supra, note 12 at 12-17. 
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defects or sales slumps—that sends the stock price downward.  Plaintiffs 
may offer evidence that, internally, management was aware of warning 
signs, perhaps even leading them to lower their private estimates of 
revenues or earnings at least in the short term.  They will claim that the 
statutory prospectus was false and misleading for failing to reveal the 
looming dangers.   
 Predictably, defendants will respond by stressing that the Securities 
Act does not require issuers to divulge forward-looking information even if 
it is material.128  The obligation, they say, is simply to obey the SEC’s line-
item requirements and include such additional information as is necessary 
to make these disclosures not misleading.  For better or worse, they are 
right.  As a result, plaintiffs in these lawsuits are forced to argue that what 
was said about past results was misleading for failure to mention the danger 
signs, which is not easy unless the issuer voluntarily put the subject of 
continuing or future performance in play.  By and large, courts say that 
truthfully revealing historical facts does not imply that the future will not be 
different. 
 To be sure, there are a couple of line-item requirements that do turn 
to the future, on which plaintiffs also seize.  There is a duty to disclose 
major risk factors, but this requires qualitative revelation of types of risk, 
not quantitative disclosure about the likelihood or impact of those risks.  
IPO lawyers are usually good about including extensive risk disclosures, 
without specifics.  There is also the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) portion of the statutory prospectus, which requires disclosure of 
“known trends and uncertainties” that would lead an investor to doubt that 
past financial performance indicates a comparable future.129   
 Sometimes these arguments work, particularly where what the 
company is facing evidences an “extreme departure” from its past 
                                                          
128  See COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 643-45, 662-63.  For a discussion of the somewhat 
confusing law surrounding the duty to disclose, see Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu 
Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1639 (2004).  
The highly publicized litigation involving Facebook’s IPO contains all of these issues.  See 
In re Facebook Inc. IPO Sec. & Deriv. Litig., 2013 WL 525158 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)(derivative 
suit dismissal).  For defendants’ presentation of these arguments—heavily contested by 
plaintiffs—see Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the 
Consolidated Class Action Complaint, 2013 WL 1874694, May 1, 2013.   
129  Item 303 of Reg. S-K, 17 CFR §220.303; see COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 606-11. 
37 
 
success.130 But more often, it seems, courts revert to the basic principle that 
forward-looking information is not the subject of mandatory disclosure, 
particularly when they take the form of projections or estimates.131  The 
issuer has to be honest about its past but need not reveal all doubts about its 
future, at least so long as it chooses to remain discretely silent on such 
matters rather than saying something affirmatively misleading.   
 In sum, what the statutory prospectus reveals to whoever chooses to 
read it is not necessarily the whole story about the issuer.  The SEC has 
deliberately restricted the duty to speak to the future, and discourages IPO 
issuers from doing so publicly, even if they want to.132  For this reason 
alone, we have to question exactly how much “filtration” value the 
preliminary prospectus has in restraining marketing and hype. 
 In the course of book-building, however, sophisticated institutional 
investors demand access to what the issuer knows about its future.  This is 
the function of non-public road shows and related communications during 
the waiting period.  It is commonplace for issuers to reveal forward-looking 
information to the underwriters and their research analysts, from which 
assessments of the future can be made.  These, in turn, are shared with key 
potential buyers, with an expectation of privacy.  This discriminatory 
treatment—selective disclosure—is acceptable practice as a means of 
encouraging institutions to be forthcoming with their bids, which as we 
have seen is key to successful book-building.  Recognizing this, the SEC 
has explicitly excluded public offerings from the scope of Regulation FD,133 
which otherwise limits selective disclosure to market professionals and 
large investors.   
 All this underscores our basic point.  For better or worse, the 
publicly-available disclosure found in a preliminary prospectus will often be 
distinctly less than everything a reasonable investor would want to know, or 
even everything that institutional investors are actually getting from the 
                                                          
130 See Shaw v. Digital Equip. Co., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996); G. Mitu Gulati, When 
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issuer and the underwriters.  If this inside information is thoroughly 
positive, this may be unproblematic—the institutions will bid up the fixed 
offering price, and indeed there may also be aftermarket buyers beyond the 
amount of their allocations.  In this regard the SEC’s long-standing 
willingness (including in Reg FD) to accept this departure from full 
disclosure for every investor reflects the value of encouraging the private 
information flow from purchasers to the issuer and underwriter that book-
building has long embodied. 
 If the inside information is negative, however, things get more 
complicated.  At some level of bad news, of course, the institutions will lose 
interest entirely—at that point, however, the underwriters would likely have 
backed out as well.  But as noted earlier, if the negative information is more 
ambiguous and the likely demand from the yet-unaware retail public is 
strong enough, the better strategy might be to buy but then sell fairly 
quickly, especially if the underwriters will tolerate aggressive reselling 
and/or settle up with preferential treatment in more attractive future IPOs.  
If so, the gap between public and private disclosure, and the use of book-
building theory to justify the difference, remain troublesome.  We believe 
that the Commission should do more here, perhaps in the nature of a special 
MD&A requirement for IPOs that sheds more light on how well the 
expectations that have been created in the marketplace mesh with the 
current realities facing management internally. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  
 One of Section 5’s two original functions, its severe restriction on 
selling communications outside of the required disclosure, has practically 
disappeared.  In part this reflects the SEC’s belief, which has grown over 
time, that a combination of filtered disclosure and strong liability will take 
care of the problem.  The extraordinary expansion in information available 
through new electronic communication capabilities no doubt has also 
contributed.  One of our contributions here is to show the concern for 
facilitating the flow of information from purchasers to issuers and 
underwriters, as illustrated in book building, provides another important 
explanation.  
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Our survey of the demise of Section 5’s communication rules should 
be cautionary, however.  Even in a world in which the initial fixed price 
buyers are heavily institutional and presumably able to fend for themselves 
(and do indeed extract more disclosure than the law requires), the ability to 
condition the market is less restrained than it used to be.  Aftermarket 
buyers, at least, would appear to be more at risk.  The justifications for 
backing off the old prophylactics—especially the supposed liability 
threats—do not bear as much weight as their proponents suggest.   
 That doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that the demise is bad 
public policy.  Some level of reform was both necessary and inevitable.134 
Perhaps legal costs go down in a more permissive environment, though 
anyone who goes through the 2005 reforms mind-numbing complexity on 
when to file a free writing prospectus pursuant to Rule 433 would be 
skeptical of this. Another possibility is that the anachronistic 
communication rules from 1954 never worked that well for investors 
anyway, so that there was little actually lost.135  We are not aware of 
empirical study of the 2005 reforms that would help us tell, and the JOBS 
Act is much too recent to make any judgments. 
 Our strong suspicion, however, is that this turns out to be a story 
about the trade-offs between capital formation and investor protection.  The 
JOBS Act comes close to acknowledging that motivation.  There was little 
effort in the legislative history to say that investors would be better off 
because of these changes—rather, the IPO changes were designed to make 
registered public offerings more appealing to entrepreneurs deciding 
whether to make one or not.  If more jobs come about as a result, we can 
hardly say for sure that a moderate erosion of investor protection wasn’t 
worth it.  Like others, however, we will wait with some skepticism to see 
precisely what comes. 
 For skeptics about IPOs, this story may simply bolster the need for 
sweeping changes.  The claim that both capital formation and investor 
protection would be improved by IPO auctions rather than a continuation of 
                                                          
134  See Cox, supra note 12, at 24-25. 
135  Conversely, it is also possible that the reforms have not really be taken advantage of, so 
that marketing practices stay much like they were even in a more liberalized setting. Those 
who believe that the First Amendment demands a more permissive approach to commercial 
speech by issuers and underwriters could justify the changes by that reason alone.  See note 
8 supra. 
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book-building has been made in both the economics and legal literature.136  
Or perhaps, as Adam Pritchard suggests, we should just declare IPOs off-
limits to retail investors, insisting on a period of seasoning for new issuers 
in the private securities markets before they graduate to the public ones.137 
 The merits of these proposals are beyond this article.  IPOs are 
enough part of the popular culture of finance to survive academic or 
political doubts about their fairness and efficacy.  Their lottery-ticket appeal 
is hard to deny.  Retail investors’ tendency to become infatuated with an 
issuer and support its aftermarket long enough for financial institutions to 
make their money is precisely the point.   
 Even though we are concerned, we do not want to be alarmist about 
all this.  The bulk of the Securities Act as it applies to public offerings 
remains, regardless of the demise of the communications bar in Section 5.  
The 2005 reforms and the JOBS Act made moderate reforms, not radical 
ones.  The SEC is still in control of the registration process, and severe civil 
liability still attaches to falsity in the registration statement upon its 
effectiveness.  But once, there was a political instinct to do more to restrain 
the selling process.  Why this is less so today is worth more attention than 
both legal scholars and investors are giving it. 
 
                                                          
136  See, e.g., Hurt, supra note 13; but see Peter Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth, 42 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 853 (2007). 
137  See Pritchard, supra note 89. 
